Why Would Anyone Like To Share His Knowledge? by Meijer, A.J. (Albert) & Homburg, V.M.F. (Vincent)
Why Would Anyone Like To Share His Knowledge?
Vincent Homburg and Albert Meijer
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Faculty of Social Sciences
Center for Public Management
PO Box 1738
NL3000DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
E-mail: homburg@fsw.eur.nl, meijer@fsw.eur.nl
Abstract
Why do workers within organizations,
or organizations in a network share
information and knowledge? This
question reverses the logic in some of
the knowledge management literature,
which addresses impediments and
problems in information and knowledge
sharing. According to property rights
theory, information sharing can be
explained in terms of self-interest,
maximizing behavior, indispensability
of groups and complementarity of
assets. Based on this line of reasoning
and on empirical evidence presented in
this paper, we conclude that the
ownership structure of information and
knowledge systems matters. In building
knowledge management systems,
developers should take into account
that the intuitive wisdom, indicating
that central control is better control,
should be interpreted with great
caution.
1. Introduction
Nowadays, organizations are becoming more and more
information-intensive. In many organizations, information
and communication technologies (ICTs) are used to
gather, process and disperse information. Often, so called
“information repositories” are created for future reference
[1, 2]. Hospitals for example are using these to both
register medical histories to support primary care
processes and also to identify epidemiological trends and
diagnosis-therapy-prognosis sequences. In commercial
business environments, information repositories are an
important impetus for organizational learning, product
innovation and process innovation because they enable the
detection of patterns, trends and so forth. Apart from these
uses, in the public sector, information repositories are also
used for the purpose of promoting political and legal
accountability [3]. They are now sometimes defined as
assets [4, 5, 6], indicating the ‘resource’ status that
information has attained alongside the more traditional
organizational resources. The crucial role that information
has come to play in organizational life demands that it
also be managed accordingly.
Bearing these considerations in mind, academics and
practitioners have emphasized the notion of information
and knowledge sharing in dealing with information
repositories [7, 8]. In fact, why would any organizational
member not contribute to information repositories when
this is obviously in the best interest of the organization as
a whole? Information and knowledge is sometimes even
shared by organizations at the level of organizational
networks. In practice, however, several barriers to the
creation and use of information repositories have been
identified. In general skepticism about codification,
currency, application and communicability of knowledge
are often identified as factors which might explain why
information and knowledge is not easily shared [9, 10].
In this paper we would like to elaborate on these
questions regarding information and knowledge sharing.
However, we do not focus on identifying barriers to the
creation and use of information repositories but inversely
ask what kind of incentives individuals in organizations or
organizations in networks of organizations have (see also
[11, 12]) in contributing to information repositories. In
other words, we ask ourselves the question why anybody
would share her or his knowledge in the first place: which
factors determine whether someone is willing to share his
information with others, inside or outside the
organization? This seems to be an important question for
anyone concerned with the design and development of
information repositories.
In the remainder of this paper, we follow Swan, Newell
and Robertson [12] and present a theory driven, rather
than a practice derived framework. In  our case, the
willingness and more specifically, the incentives of
individuals and organizations to share information and
knowledge, at both the organization and the
interorganizational level, are respectively analyzed. More
specifically, we use property rights theory [4, 5, 6, 13] to
illustrate why self-interested individuals and organizations
share (or: refuse to share) information and knowledge.
This paper is organized as follows. In section two, the
research methodology is set out briefly. Section three
describes the theoretical framework. Empirical data is
presented in section four. In section five, results are
summarized and discussed. This paper ends with
conclusions and future research plans in section six.
2. Research methodology
The research objective of this study is to sharpen
theoretical constructs in order to be able to contribute to
the debate on information and knowledge sharing, both
within and between organizations. This objective, loosely
referred to as theory construction (rather than
theory testing), indicates that the study has an
exploratory character and therefore, considerable
emphasis has been put on conceptual analysis of novel
theories.
In order to confront initial explanations, propositions
have been confronted with empirical data by means of two
distinct strategies. Firstly, an exploratory expert
consultation was undertaken in order to clarify empirical
phenomena and to sharpen initial theoretical constructs.
This consultation consisted of two consecutive e-mail
questionnaires among an international panel of thirty
experts in the field of electronic record keeping. In this
questionnaire, the implications of using and introducing
ICT-applications for the availability of information were
addressed (for details, refer to [3]). In this study, the focus
was on the level of individuals within an organization.
The results of this consultation are presented in section
4.2.
The initial theoretical propositions, confronted with the
outcomes of this Delphi-like expert consultation, were
furthermore confronted with case study data that
concerned information sharing of organizations in a
network. The case study, which is described in detail in
section 4.3, took place over a period of four months. In
the study, data triangulation was emphasized and thus,
data was gathered from several sources. Apart from
analysis of policy documents, policy proposals and
evaluation studies, fifteen semi-structured interviews with
several stakeholders in a network of organizations were
carried out.
The results of this study has given a rich, theoretically
relevant picture of incentives with respect to information
and knowledge sharing. It must be noted that, statistical
generality has not been pursued. Therefore, the
conclusions from this study are to be explored further and
testable hypotheses are to be developed and tested in a
real, live empirical setting. At this moment, however, we
think that we have contributed to the process of theorizing
about incentives, control of information and knowledge
and knowledge sharing.
3. Information, Control and Ownership
3.1 Introduction
The increasing availability of information and
knowledge, embedded in ICTs, gives rise to dilemmas
with respect to the control over information repositories.
Concerning these issues, two archetypical positions can be
discerned:
• Central control over the information repository. This
warrants central preservation and access to
information. However, users may not be willing to
contribute optimally to this repository since they do
not bear any responsibility with respect to the
repository.
• Decentral control over the information repository.
When participants are responsible for their part of the
repository they are assumed to be more willing to
contribute to the repository. However, this may lead
to fragmented, less easily accessible repository.
Popular wisdom in the knowledge management
discipline states information and knowledge assets have to
be centrally controlled, in such a way that ownership
of information and knowledge coincides with the
boundaries of the firm. In this situation, the organization’s
stockholders (or a department acting on behalf of them,
such as an IS department) control and operate the
information repository, and ultimately determine
privileges (for usage, access, creation and modifying
information and knowledge) since these privileges have
not been explicitly granted to others. Van Alstyne,
Brynjolfsson and Madnick refer to these privileges as
residual right of control and illustrate this
popular wisdom by stating that “(…) information systems
designers often argue that central control is better control”
[4, p. 267]. However, other scholars, like Killian and
Wind, state with respect to information assets, that “(…)
centralized ownership is often a second best, and indeed,
occasionally the worst solution” [14, p. 274]. In order to
clarify this controversy, it is necessary to analyze how
ownership affects the functionality, profitability, and
viability of information and knowledge assets [see also
13]. In order to do that, we first turn to property rights
theory.
3.2 Information Property Rights Theory
A promising theoretical perspective which has been
used to analyze governance and control with respect to
assets is property rights theory [6, 15, 16]. Property rights
are the rights to use (usus), reconstruct (abusus) and
exploit (usus fructus) assets [15; 16]. The theory
can be used to analyze governance mechanisms with
respect to information assets and from the analysis, it is
possible to show how information ownership in and
between organizations affects the willingness to share
information and knowledge.
The theory has a number of assumptions. The first
assumption (A1) is concerned with bounded rationality,
which in this case implies that property rights with respect
to assets can never be completely regulated by means of
contractual arrangements (e.g., designated rights).
There will always be some contingencies that can not be
anticipated  beforehand, and hence, residual rights
and residual claims (that is, ownership) are
relevant. A special characteristic of ownership is that the
rights not covered in a contract, reside with the owner; in
other words, the owner is residual claimant. As we
will elaborate later, this implies that owners always have
more intensive incentives with respect to assets than non-
owners.
The second assumption is that ownership of
information and knowledge is not by definition assumed
to accrue with the legal owners of an organization or a
network of organizations (which in fact is true in a strictly
formal, legal sense). Rather, but more realistically, various
groups within the firm can be assumed to be the de
facto owners with residual rights of control that can be
transferred by changes in organizational structure or
management edict (A2; see [4]). It is thus possible to
identify two archetypes of asset ownership:
concentrated ownership, in which ownership
(residual rights) resides with one department in an
organization or one organization in a network of
organizations (cf. a central database), and dispersed
ownership, in which departments in an organization or
organizations in a network of organizations may exercise
residual usus, abusus and usus fructus
property rights with respect to the information and
knowledge assets they are working with. In this situation,
departments in organizations or organizations in a
network of organizations may remodel data structures,
employ different standards, et cetera as long as the
minimally required forms of standardization that exchange
of knowledge and information requires, are not violated
(cf. a set of databases with a referral index).
The third assumption is that information and
knowledge assets require at least some specific
investments by organizational members working with
them. This includes expertise, training and human capital.
These investments are assumed to by typically
noncontractible [13], and hence, not all costs that are
incurred by information assets are fully verifiable. This
means that they cannot be compensated directly (A3).
The key element with respect to assets in a property
rights line of reasoning is self-interest: owners have a
greater vested interest in information and knowledge
assets than non-owners. This is so because owners of
assets have access to designated and residual property
rights, and are thus residual claimants. Therefore, owners
can more fully appropriate benefits resulting from
investment in assets than non-owners can. Inversely, this
also means that owners have more intensive incentives to
invest in assets and to adopt quality-enhancing or cost-
saving innovations than non-owners have. Non-owners
also have the possibility to bargain for some of the surplus
that results from their specific investments (eventually in
the form of higher wages, promotions, or even more
leisure time or on-the job consumption), but some of these
benefits will always accrue to the owner in the bargaining
process, mitigating the incentives of the non-owner.
According to property rights theory, degraded incentives
of non-owners gives rise to very subtle intangible costs of
low effort. In the case of information this may occur
through distorted, missing or unusable data [4], which
eventually affects the viability of information and
knowledge systems.
In order to analyze governance mechanisms and
behavioral effects of ownership (i.c. ex-post bargaining),
it is necessary to look at characteristics of the assets
involved. In fact, property rights theory describes three
situations: a ‘standard’ situation, a situation of
complementary assets, and a situation of indispensable
participants (departments or organizations)..
The incentives in standard situations can be described
as follows. If self-interested employees are using and
contributing to information and knowledge repository they
don’t own (e.g., can not fully exert property rights with
respect to assets), these employees will try to be
compensated for specific investments (for example,
participation in on-the-job training programs). To do so,
they have to bargain for extra wages, promotions, et
cetera, with the owner of the assets. It can be expected
that in this bargaining process, some of the (even non-
monetary) surplus that results from the specific
investments accrues to the owner. This means that the
employees face degraded incentives to participate in on-
the-job training programs or any other forms of specific
investments in the information and knowledge assets. This
leads to subtle, intangible costs of low effort which may
eventually result in distorted, missing, or unusable
information submitted to central data bases, and, in
general, in less viable information and knowledge
systems. In this case, incentives for employees can be
restored by changing the ownership structure in such a
way that property rights are granted to the employees. In
this case, one can imagine that various groups within an
organization are using and building their own information
and knowledge repositories that support them in the
fulfillment of their tasks, and that a referral index is set up
in order to enable a very minimal form of information and
knowledge sharing. Although information and knowledge
sharing by itself is in this situation less standardized and
presumably more difficult, the incentives of the employees
working with information and knowledge assets are more
intense, their incentives to perform well and to use and
contribute to information and knowledge assets, are
restored. This decentralized ownership structure implies
that groups of users can exert usus, abusus and
usus fructus property rights and thus the incentive
intensity and with that, the viability of the information and
knowledge assets, increases. Note that such a situation
contradicts the popular wisdom stating that centralized
control is better control. In fact, the caricatural phrase ‘a
boss can tell a worker what to do’ is replaced by the
sentence ‘rental cars are driven less carefully than cars
driven by their owners’.
In the other situations property rights theory identifies,
complementarity and indispensability, the bargaining
process is somewhat different. Complementarity of assets
refers to the situation in which knowledge assets only
yield value when they are strictly used in conjunction with
each other. If we take the example of a decentralized
ownership structure with respect to information and
knowledge systems, we see that surplus generated by
means of specific investments by employees have to be
compensated in a bargaining process involving employees
and both the complementary assets’ owners. Here, placing
the complementary assets under central control (e.g.,
mitigating property rights) restores incentives because
surplus has to be divided among less parties. An
analogous line of reasoning also holds for the situation in
which one of the groups in an organization (or one
organization in a network of organizations) is
indispensable (for a formal proof, refer to [4, 15; 16]).
3.3 Synopsis: Property Right Propositions
Property rights theory, applied to information and
knowledge assets, makes clear that the ownership
structure matters. This is because ownership affects
incentive intensity, and incentive intensity affects the
viability of information assets through levels of specific
investments. This is true for an organization consisting of
a number of departments, as well as for organizations
using ICTs to share information and knowledge in a
network of organizations (by means of, for example, an
interorganizational information system [6]). The key tenet
of property rights theory is that:
• In the presence of strictly complementary information
and knowledge assets and/or in the presence of
indispensable groups or organizations in a network,
usus, abusus and usus fructus property
rights should be centralized.
• In all other situations, incentives (and with that, the
viability of information and knowledge assets), can be
improved by decentralizing property rights. Of course
a decentralized ownership structure brings about
disadvantages, but according to property rights
theory, these disadvantages are compensated by the
improved incentive intensity.
In order to illustrate the mechanisms of property rights,
in the next section, empirical data is presented.
4. Property Rights in Practice: Empirical
Data
4.1 Introduction
In order to investigate what importance ownership and
control have with respect to information and knowledge
assets, the property rights line of reasoning has been
confronted with empirical data. In section 4.2, some
results of an expert consultation are presented. These
results illustrate some of the dilemmas that surround
information sharing by individuals in an organization (for
a detailed report on the results of this study, refer to [3]).
This study gives information about the advantages and
disadvantages of concentrated and dispersed ownership of
information. In section 4.3, a case study of information
and knowledge exchange by organizations in the Dutch
sector of Higher Education and Research is used to
illustrate the mechanisms of property rights theory.
4.2 Information sharing by individuals in an
organization
In order to investigate the way organizations in practice
deal with the ownership of information and knowledge
assets, data from a consultation of thirty experts in the
field of electronic record keeping were analyzed for trade-
offs and dilemma’s with respect to the control of
information and knowledge assets. In the study, several
information and communication technologies are
discerned. These are: e-mail systems, database
management systems, generic software for creation of
office documents, web technology systems and smart
systems. The original study’s objective was to clarify the
experts’ opinions on (1) what data should be kept and
(2) how these data should be kept. In the context of the
research objective mentioned in the introduction of this
study, the latter question is of particular interest to us.
For the various investigated technologies from the
expert consultation it is clear that there is a constant and
real-existent practical dilemma between central and
individual ownership. This is especially true for e-mail
systems, office document software and web-technology
systems. As one of the experts in the survey wrote: “The
introduction of e-mail as a business communication tool
has put the filing and control of e-mail-based
correspondence exclusively in the hands of the individual
users - and consequently the preservation of e-mail has
become ‘individualized’ and unregulated”. For database
management systems and smart systems, these issues
seemed less relevant to the experts in the consultation.
They seem to assume that ownership over these systems is
generally not under control of individuals.
A lack of central control may impede the retrieval of
information (e.g. text documents and e-mail messages).
However, central control may lead to what the experts
referred to as de-contextualization. This refers to the
situation in which information and knowledge is used for
other purposes than originally envisaged, and the context
of the business processes in which the information and
knowledge was originally gathered, is lost. This means
that there is opportunity for misinterpretation of the
information.
Thus, the expert consultation did show that the use of
ICTs can lead to questions concerning concentrated and
dispersed ownership and highlights the relevance of
ownership. Advantages and disadvantages of concentrated
and dispersed ownership were brought forward. The
consultation did not, however, shed light on workers’ and
asset owner’s incentives to use and contribute to
information and knowledge assets. Therefore, an
additional study has been undertaken, a case study on the
exchange of information in a network of organizations.
4.3 Information sharing by organizations in a
network
In networks of cooperating organizations, ownership
and control of information sometimes result in all kinds of
ownership disputes, politicking, and so forth [17, 18, 19].
In general, this conflict can be analyzed as a conflict
between the virtues of centralized, ubiquitous storage of
data (in case of which diminished incentives of
participating organizations eventually result in distorted,
missing or incomplete data) and decentralized storage of
data (in case of which information exchange is sometimes
hampered because of incompatible data formats or data
definitions).
The Dutch Higher Education and Research institutions
provide an interesting example of dealing with
information and knowledge assets in an
interorganizational context. The field consists of a number
of semi-autonomous institutions. Besides the Ministry,
there are the universities and other research institutes, with
their respective interest associations: the VSNU
(Association of Dutch Universities) and the Royal Dutch
Academy of Sciences- KNAW.
A special case within this context is the case of
exchange of information on research activities. The case
description will, from now on, focus on the exchange of
information on research projects, which have been
motivated by the wish to ‘expose’ current research
activities to the academic and business communities. The
information and knowledge assets involved are
information systems embodying information on research
projects carried out by universities and research institutes.
In 1988, in order to contribute to the goal of sharing
and exposing of knowledge, plans were drafted to design
and develop a central repository, the National Research
Database (NOD). This was to be owned by a separate
organization, the NBOI (the Netherlands Bureau of
Research Information, later on renamed as NIWI,
Netherlands Institute for Scientific Information).  The
development of the NOD system took a very long time.
Eventually, in 1995, an information agreement was
drafted stating that “research institutions have in principle
agreed that they will submit research information to the
NOD”. As a result of this agreement, the NBOI assumed
that the institutions were obliged to submit research
information to the NOD. The institutions, on the other
hand, assumed that an obligation existed only if there was
not a single trace of doubt as to (1) the method of
submission of information and (2) what organization
should receive the information (e.g., to whom the NBOI
should forward management information). The NOD
criticized universities and their interest association over
their poor provision of research information to the central
repository at the NOD. In addition they wished to clarify
who should be responsible for contributing to their costs
for maintaining this repository. In fact, it was felt by the
NBOI that the commitment of universities to the
importance of ‘exposure’ of research activities by the
NOD diminished because they did not experience any
benefits from the NOD. In a meeting of the interest
association of the universities, it is stated that “(…) the
participating institutions are not fully convinced of the
usefulness of the [NOD]. (…). [S]pecific partitions of the
database, to be used by the universities for their own
‘strategic’ research policies, are not yet available (…).
The academic institutes are apprehensive of putting
research information, which is to be classified as
‘strategic’ and which consists of input and output data at
specific aggregation levels, at the disposal of (potential)
users without explicit permission. If it is not clear to what
use the information is to be put, [the institutions] refuse to
supply this information”. The background of this point of
view is clear from the following line of reasoning: “(…) if
the NOD is accessible unconditionally, the Ministry is,
through the back door, allowed access to information that,
given the position of government, has to be characterized
as ‘management information’. Seen from the point of view
of the universities, the supply of such an amount of
management information is not acceptable”. Although the
participating institutions had agreed to contribute to and
use the NOD, actual information and knowledge sharing
by means of the NOD never met the objectives. During an
Information Conference, it was noted that “[t]here is a
problem concerning the filling of the NOD. Of fourteen
universities, eight have a contract for electronic data
interchange. By far not all research activities have been
entered into the system (…)”.
Gradually it became clear that the relatively centralized
NOD system, owned by NBOI, could be classified as a
failure. In the proceedings of another Information
Conference, a representative of the institutions notes:
“(…) from the reports, consults and interviews, it is clear
that stakeholders prefer a coordinating and referring
function with respect to research information systems.
Therefore, no need exists for a complete, central and
uniform register with detailed information with respect to
output of research activities”.
Following various meetings, the interest association of
the universities, VSNU, starts to develop a new initiative,
CombiSearch/CombiFormat, which technically resembles
the NOD database, with one difference: it is explicitly
acknowledged that the institutions ‘own’ the various
decentralized information systems. A data model is
developed by VSNU, but it can be adapted by the various
participating institutions. During a short period of time,
two competing initiatives for the collection of information
on research activities emerged: the centralized NOD
initiative, and the decentralized initiatives, also referred to
as OIS/OZIS, by the institutions. As neither of the
participating institutions nor NBOI had an interest in
further fueling the debate between the competing
knowledge management approaches of gathering research
information, the NOD was gradually transformed into a
referral system. The (new) NOD then, enables access from
comparable information systems abroad (the report
mentions the European CORDIS information system, the
English CRIB database and the Belgian IWETO system).
After about 10 years of struggling, the owner of the
centralized NOD admitted that “the alternative of
decentralized data storage will predominate (…). [This
implies] a changed role of the NOD, with a more
important role for the decentralized input of data by the
institutions who are responsible for the research activities.
The role of NBOI/NIWI will change towards quality
assurance and the active (international) marketing of the
research information (…). In the long run the NBOI/NIWI
database will consist of hyperlinks to the institutions’
OZIS information”.
5. Summary of findings and discussion
At the level of individuals in an organization the
consultation of experts showed that the introduction of
ICTs can lead to dilemmas concerning concentrated of
dispersed ownership over information. Both have
advantages and disadvantages. A lack of central control
may impede the retrieval of documents and e-mail
messages. However, central control may lead to de-
contextualization. This refers to the situation in which
information and knowledge is used for other purposes
than originally envisaged, and the context of the business
processes in which the information and knowledge was
originally gathered, is lost. This presents the opportunity
for misinterpretation of the information.
At the level of organizations in a network the case of
knowledge sharing by the participating institutions in the
field of Dutch Higher Education and Research is a very
sensitive subject. Over time, it has become clear that (1)
the participating institutions’ behavior in the network can
be explained in terms of their self-interest and (2) that
ownership of the research information is a very crucial
concept. Firstly, as the property rights theory line of
reasoning indicates, the institutions had very limited
incentives to use and contribute to the NOD and
consequently, the databases suffered from distorted and
missing data. Secondly, because NBOI was residual
claimant, the institutions also feared (and, later on,
actively opposed) the position of NBOI. The reason for
this was that NBOI, being ‘owner’ and residual claimant,
was allowed to allocate residual rights of control with
respect to the information and knowledge assets in a way
which was very unfortunate for the participating
institutions. NBOI’s the residual rights of control allowed
them to report to the Ministry about performance and
other management information of the institutions. In short,
the incentives of the participating institutions to use and
contribute to the centralized NOD system were very weak.
The fact that a more decentralized system emerged
provides support for the property rights theory line of
reasoning. Just as property rights theory predicts, a
decentralized ownership structure  with the participating
institutions acting as residual claimants, provided the
institutions with more intensive incentives to perform.
Furthermore, this ownership structure protected the
institutions from unwanted interorganizational
surveillance by NBOI.
As has been explained in the methodology section of
this article, the research objective was to develop rather
than to test theory. Therefore, the case study can not be
used to actually corroborate or reject property rights
theory. However, the case study data, in our opinion,
provide at least some support for the usefulness of the
constructs identified in property rights theory, such as
‘ownership’ of information and knowledge and residual
property rights. In fact, the NOD indeed suffered from
missing and distorted data, just as property rights theory’s
propositions stated. This problem, moreover, disappeared
when the OIS system (with a basically different ownership
structure) was implemented and obviously, incentives
were restored. Nevertheless, both the property theory line
of reasoning as well as the case study have serious
limitations. First of all, the line of reasoning, including the
depiction of employees acting completely out of self-
interest is of course a caricature (but perhaps not such an
unrealistic one [20]). However, perhaps this view on
workers and organizations participating in some sort of
alliance or network is suitable to complement the
sometimes very altruistic view on human beings and
organizations which is adhered to in some parts of the
knowledge management literature. Second property rights
theory is not at all clear about the exact mechanisms that
change the viability of assets as a result of a change in
ownership structure. Property rights theory proposes very
subtle mechanisms, which are not observable, but
hypothesizes that eventually, they matter. Thirdly,
property rights theory proposes an economic explanation
of how ownership affects the behavior of people owning
and/or using information and knowledge assets. However,
from the case study, it should be clear that there definitely
is also an organizational-political logic, indicating that
organizations want to preserve their autonomy as much as
possible [6]. In fact, one might conclude that the
participating institutions are trying to prevent the ‘de-
contextualization’, which has been mentioned as a danger
of central ownership in the expert consultation study. At
this moment, property rights theory lacks a robust
‘political’ explanation. Studies by Orlikowski [18],
Markus [17] and descriptions of the British Criminal
Justice System and the Dutch Penal Law Enforcement
Value Chain address such a ‘political’ explanation, albeit
it is less formal and rigorous than a property rights theory
explanation.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this study, the focus was on identifying why workers
within organizations or organizations in an alliance or
network of organizations share information and
knowledge. This question, which is of course reflected in
the title of the study, reverses some of the logic in the
knowledge management literature, which addresses
impediments and problems in information and knowledge
sharing. We have used property rights theory to analyze
information and knowledge sharing. This theory explains
the behavior of individual organizational members and of
organizations in alliances in terms of self-interest,
maximizing behavior, and especially ownership structures.
It hypotheses that human beings and organizations in
alliances share information and knowledge when it is
in their best interest. The question of when
this is so is, among other things, determined by the
ownership structure. The line of reasoning is that in the
absence of complete contracts (e.g., assuming bounded
rationality), and assuming no strict complementarity of
assets or indispensability of actors, dispersed
ownership of assets results in viable information and
knowledge assets. The line of reasoning indicates that in
this situation, incentives for organizational members or
organizations cooperating in networks are intense and that
this results in functional, profitable and viable information
and knowledge assets and optimal conditions to share
information and knowledge. This proposition was in fact
acknowledged in the case study in which a change in
ownership structure (from a concentrated ownership
structure to a dispersed ownership structure) could be
used to explain why the centrally organized NOD failed
and the decentralized OIS system proved to be successful.
Interesting in this case was that the same technology was
used in both systems (e.g., standard data base technology),
and the change in effects can be attributed to the change in
ownership structure. This in fact confirms the statement of
one IS practitioner, quoted by Davenport, Eccles and
Prusak.: “No technology has yet been invented to
convince unwilling managers to share information” [19, p.
56].
The fundamental point here, of course, is thus that
ownership of information and knowledge system matters.
In building knowledge management systems, developers
should take into account than the intuitive wisdom,
indicating that central control is better control, should be
interpreted with great caution. Rather developers and
managers should look at characteristics of assets and
groups in organizations or organizations in alliances in
terms of complementarity of assets and indispensability of
groups, and determine appropriate ownership structures.
In the presence of strictly complementary information and
knowledge assets and/or in the presence of indispensable
groups or organizations in a network, usus, abusus
and usus fructus property rights should be
centralized and a central information repository is
preferable. However, in all other situations, for some
people counter-intuitively, incentives (and with that, the
viability of information and knowledge assets), can be
improved by decentralizing property rights and thus the
design of an information system should be based on the
idea of a federation of various information repositories. Of
course a decentralized ownership structure brings about
disadvantages, but according to property rights theory,
these disadvantages are compensated by the improved
incentive intensity. The basic lines of reasoning described
in this study, however, should not be taken up as a
cookbook. Ownership structures and decentralization of
property rights provide complex problems (for example,
organizational-political problems which, at this moment in
time, are very hard to formalize), which have been
explored only in a limited and exploratory way. Future
research endeavors should try to define and operationalize
more carefully the notions of residual property rights,
ownership, complementarity of assets and indispensability
of groups, and to test hypotheses in rich empirical
settings. It is our conviction that the knowledge
management community can benefit from these insights.
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